Introduction and Motivation
Modern cryptography has had considerable impact on the development of computational learning theory. Virtually every intractability result in Valiant's model 13] (which is representation-independent in the sense that it does not rely on an arti cial syntactic restriction on the learning algorithm's hypotheses) has at its heart a cryptographic construction 4, 9, 1, 10] . In this paper, we give results in the reverse direction by showing how to construct several cryptographic primitives based on certain assumptions on the di culty of learning. In doing so, we develop further a line of thought introduced by Impagliazzo and Levin 6].
As we describe, standard de nitions in learning theory and cryptography do not appear to correspond perfectly in their original forms. However, we show that natural modi cations to standard learning de nitions can yield the desired connections. The particular cryptographic primitives we consider are pseudorandom bit generators, one-way functions, and private-key cryptosystems. We give transformations of hard learning problems into these cryptographic primitives with the desirable property that the complexity of the resulting primitive is not much greater than that of the hard-to-learn functions and distributions. In particular, our constructions are especially adept at preserving the degree of parallelism inherent in the hard functions and distributions.
Note that while it is well-known that some of the primitives above imply the existence of others (for instance, the equivalence of bit generators and one-way functions) 14, 7] , we are interested in the separate results because the equivalences between primitives often do not preserve complexity measures such as circuit depth (parallelism). For instance, it is not known how to construct a bit generator in NC given a one-way function in N C. One of the main potential bene ts of this line of research is that as \simple" function classes (for instance, DNF formulae) continue to elude e cient learning, our belief in the intractability of learning such classes increases, and we can exploit this intractability to obtain simpler cryptographic primitives.
In addition to generic transformations, we describe a very simple pseudorandom bit generator based on the assumption that the class of parity functions is hard to learn in the presense of random noise (an assumption similar to the intractability of decoding random linear codes). This generator is quite similar to a proposed one-way function due to Goldreich, Krawczyk and Luby 3], who then obtain a generator by running the one-way function through a generic transformation. We show that the output of this one-way function is already pseudorandom. This stronger assertion is apparently already known to some researchers in the cryptography community as a \folk theorem".
The Apparent Necessity of Average-Case Assumptions
In most learning theory models, a learning algorithmis required for every value of n to learn all functions over f0;1g n that meet some (usually strong) constraints known to the algorithm. For instance, we might ask that the learning algorithm be able to learn any DNF formula over f0;1g n with at most n 2 terms. Under such a de nition, a failed DNF learning algorithm might still always be able to learn any n 2 -term DNF provided n was even, and might learn all but a small scattered set of n 2 -term DNF formulae when n was odd. A \hard" learning problem with such an algorithm seems not especially useful for cryptography.
We thus introduce an average-case model of learning that reduces these discrepancies between hardness for learning and the conditions required by cryptography, but otherwise preserves both the spirit and technical aspects of many existing models in learning theory. We then proceed to demonstrate that this worst-case/average-case discrepancy was essentially the only barrier to a natural correspondence between hard learning problems and many common cryptographic primitives.
Preliminaries

Learning Models
The learning models we consider are models of learning boolean functions from labeled examples.
Throughout the paper, F n will denote a class of boolean functions over f0;1g n , so each f 2 F n is a mapping f : f0;1g n ! f0;1g. We assume that each function in F n is represented using some xed and reasonable representation scheme. A representation scheme for F n is a pair (R n ;E n ), where R n f0;1g r(n) for some xed polynomial r(n), and E n : R n ! F n is an onto mapping.
We interpret a string 2 R n as a representation of the function E n ( ) 2 F n . Note that a function f 2 F n may have many representations in R n . Also, since R n contains only r(n)-bit strings, we are insisting that each function in F n have a \short" representation. We shall see that the computational details of evaluating the representations are relevant to our study. We de ne F = fF n g and (R; E) = f(R n ;E n )g.
In our average-case learning models, the unknown target function will be generated according to some xed distribution P n over the function class F n from the distribution ensemble P = fP n g over F. When we have xed a representation scheme (R;E) for F, sometimes we instead prefer to think of P n as a distribution over representations R n , which implicitly de nes a distribution over F n .
Once a target function f 2 F n is generated according to P n (which we shall denote f 2 P n ), a learning algorithm will receive access to labeled examples of f selected according to some xed distribution D n over the input space f0;1g n from the distribution ensemble D = fD n g. Each example is a pair hx;f(x)i where x is drawn randomly according to D n (denoted x 2 D n ). If S = x 1 ; .. .;x m is a sequence of inputs from f0;1g n , we use hS;fi to denote the sequence hx 1 ; f(x 1 )i; .. .;hx m ;f(x m )i of labeled examples of f. De nition1. Let F be a class of boolean functions, P a distribution ensemble over F, and D a distribution ensemble over f0;1g . For any 0 < < 1=2, we say that F is -predictable on average with respect to P and D if there exists a polynomial time algorithm M (taking a labeled sample hS;fi and a test input x) and a polynomial m(n) such that for in nitely many n, Pr f2Pn;S2D m(n) n ;x2Dn M(hS;fi;x) = f(x)] 1 ? :
We call M an -prediction algorithm (for F with respect to P and D), and the function m(n) is the sample size of M.
Note that in this de nition, a smaller value of places a greater demand on the learning algorithm. We will want in particular to consider two extreme cases of predictability as follows:
De nition2. Let F be a class of boolean functions, P a distribution ensemble over F, and D a distribution ensemble over f0;1g . We say that F is weakly predictable on average with respect to P and D if there exists some xed polynomial q(n) such that F is (1=2?1=q(n))-predictable on average with respect to P and D. We say that F is strongly predictable on average with respect to P and D if for any polynomial q(n), F is 1=q(n)-predictable on average with respect to P and D.
We will also consider these same learning models when the learning algorithm is provided with membership queries. Here the de nitions of prediction on average remain unchanged, but in addition to random labeled examples, the learning algorithm may receive the value f(x) on inputs x of its own choosing; the test inputx is drawn after all queries are made to prevent the algorithm from cheating by querying f(x).
Measuring the Complexity of Representation Schemes and Distributions
In order to quantify the complexity of our proposed cryptographic primitives, we need to de ne complexity measures for the representation scheme (R; E) and the distribution ensembles P and D. As we have mentioned, we use uniform circuit families to allow the most precise statements and to emphasize the preservation of parallelism in our constructions. We begin with the straightforward case of the input distribution ensemble D. De nition3. Let D be a distribution ensemble over f0;1g , and let D = fD n g be a uniform circuit sequence, where D n takes d(n) input bits for some polynomial d(n) and outputs n bits. We say that D is generated by D if for every n, the output distribution of D n is exactly D n : that is, if we choose w uniformly at random from f0;1g d(n) then D n (w) 2 f0;1g n is distributed according to D n .
We wish to formulate a similar notion for the generation of the distribution P. For our cryptographic constructions, given a xed representation scheme (R; E), it will be easier to think of the function distribution P n as being over the set R n (rather than over function class F n itself), which then implicitly de nes a distribution over F n under E n . In this case we can de ne what it means for P to be generated by a circuit sequence.
De nition4. Let P be a distribution ensemble over R n f0;1g r(n) , and let P = fP n g be a uniform circuit sequence, where P n takes p(n) input bits and outputs r(n) bits for polynomials p(n) and r(n). We say that P is generated by P if for every n, the output distribution of P n is exactly P n : that is, if we choose w uniformly at random from f0;1g p(n) then P n (w) 2 R n is distributed according to P n .
A distribution P over R that allows very rapid generation of function representations will not be especially useful to us if the representation of f makes it expensive to compute f(x). Thus, we make the following de nition:
De nition5. Let (R; E) be an encoding scheme for F such that R n f0;1g r(n) , and let E = fE n g be a uniform circuit sequence, where E n takes r(n) + n input bits and outputs a single bit. We say that (R; E) can be evaluated by E if for every n, on inputs f 2 R n such that f = E n ( f ) 2 F n and x 2 f0;1g n , we have
Finally, we will need to de ne circuit sequences that are formed from other circuit sequences in certain ways. If C = fC n g is a circuit sequence, we dene C m = fC m n g to be the sequence of m-fold replication of the circuits in C.
More precisely, the circuit C m n takes m n inputs, and consists of m disjoint \copies" of C n : on inputs x 1 ; .. .;x m 2 f0;1g n , the output C m n (x 1 ;.. .; x m ) is the concatenation of C n (x 1 ); .. .; C n (x m ).
If C and D are sequences of circuits, we de ne the sequence C D = fC n D n g as follows: the circuit C n D n has q(n) inputs for some polynomial q(n). Some or all of these inputs feed the xed circuit D n , whose outputs (along with some or all of the inputs) in turn feed the xed circuit C n . (Note that C n D n is technically a set of circuits since we have not speci ed exactly how the inputs are wired.) Similarly, if C,D and E are sequences of circuits, the sequence C (D;E) is that in which the circuit C n (D n ; E n ) has some or all of its inputs fed to the xed circuits D n and E n in parallel, whose outputs (along with some or all of the inputs) in turn feed the xed circuit C n . So, replication increases the circuit width, and the composition operation increases circuit depth.
Discussion
Several widely studied function classes, such as DNF formulas, are believed to be hard to learn even when the distribution D is uniform. There has been less formal work studying what hard function distributions look like because distribution P is not used in the standard models. The following, however, is a distribution on DNF formulas that seems to defy all known methods of attack, and we believe that any method that could even weakly predict such functions over a uniform D would require profoundly new ideas.
Select at random two disjoint sets A; B f1;.. .; ng each of size log n. On input x, compute the parity of the bits indexed by A and the majority function of the bits indexed by B, and output the exclusive-or of the two results. This function can be represented by a polynomial size DNF formula (or decision tree) since the truth table has only 2 2 log n = n and let P be generated by the uniform circuit sequence P. Then if F is not weakly predictable on average with respect to P and U, there is a CSPRBG computed by the uniform circuit sequence E m(n) P for some xed polynomial m(n).
Proof. (Sketch) Informally, for any n, the bit generator G n behaves as follows:
it takes as input a random bit string, and uses some of these bits to generate a function f 2 F n according to the distribution P n . The rest of the input bits are used directly as m inputs, x 1 ; .. .;x m 2 f0;1g n for f. The output of the generator consists of x 1 ;. ..; x m followed by the m bits f(x 1 ); ... ;f(x m ).
More formally, G n takes as input a random string of p(n) + m n bits. Here p(n) is the number of random input bits required by the circuit P n for generating a representation f 2 R n of a function f = E n ( f ) 2 F n , where f is distributed according to P; m will be determined by the analysis. The generator feeds the rst p(n) input bits into P n to obtain f . The remaining m n random input bits are regarded as m random vectors x 1 ; ; x m 2 f0;1g n . For each i the generator then feeds f and x i to a parallel copy of E n to obtain E n ( f ;x i ) = f(x i ). The output of the generator is then x 1 ;. .. ;x m ; f(x 1 ); .. .; f(x m ). It is easy to verify that G is computed by the circuit sequence E m P. Since our generator produces g(n) = m n + m output bits, we obtain expansion provided that m > p(n).
We now argue that G is in fact a CSPRBG. For contradiction, suppose that G is not, and let T be a polynomial time algorithm such that Pr y2f0;1g g(n) T(y) = 1] ? Pr x2f0;1g n T(G(x)) = 1] 1=q(n) for some polynomial q(n). For each 0 i m, let t i denote the probability that T outputs 1 when its rst i + mn input bits are the rst i + mn bits of G(x) on random x, and the remaining input bits of T are truly random. Note that by de nition of G n , when i = 0 the input to T is truly random. So we have jt 0 ? t m j 1=q(n), and by a standard \probability walk" argument there must be an 0 i < m such that jt i ? t i+1 j 1=(m q(n)). Furthermore, we can nd such an i (approximately) with high probability by performing repeated experiments with T using random draws from P n and D n , and once such an i is found we can \center the bias" to produce an e cient algorithm T 0 such that t 0 i 1=2 + 1=q 0 (n) and t 0 i+1 1=2 ? 1=q 0 (n) for some polynomial q(n).
Algorithm T 0 thus has the following property: suppose we draw a function f randomly according to P n , and draw m random n-bit vectors x 1 ;.. .; x m and we give T 0 the inputs x 1 ; .. .;x m along with f(x 1 ); .. .; f(x i ), followed by an input bit b i+1 that is either f(x i+1 ) or a truly random bit, followed by g(n) ? i ? 1 random bits. Then T 0 can determine with probability signi cantly better than random guessing whether its i + 1st input bit b i+1 is f(x i+1 ) or a truly random bit; we interpret an output of 1 as a guess that b i+1 is random, and an output of 0 as a guess that b i+1 = f(x i+1 ). Now suppose we have access to random examples according to U n of a target function f drawn according to P n , and we also have a random test inputx.
Suppose we give to T 0 the random strings x 1 ; .. .; x i ;x; x i+2 ; .. .; x m followed by f(x 1 ); .. .;f(x i ), followed by an undetermined input bit b i+1 , followed by g(n)?i?1 random bits. Then it is easy to show by a simple averaging argument that the following strategy yields an algorithm for weakly predicting F with respect to P and U: with the other inputs as speci ed, we run T 0 both with b i+1 = 0 and b i+1 = 1. If both inputs cause an output of 0, or both inputs cause an output of 1, we ip a coin to predict f(x). Otherwise, we predict that f(x) is the value of b i+1 that caused T 0 to output 0. u t
The following simple lemma relates the hardness of learning a function class with respect to some input distribution ensemble to the hardness of learning a related function class with respect to the uniform distribution ensemble.
Lemma 8. Let F be a class of boolean functions, P a distribution ensemble over F, and D a distribution ensemble over f0;1g . Let the ensemble D be generated by the circuit sequence D, and let F D denote the class of functions obtainable by composing a function in F n with the circuit D n . Then for any , if F is not -predictable on average with respect to P and D, then F D is not -predictable on average with respect to P and the uniform ensemble U over f0;1g .
Proof. Immediate;we are simply letting the computation of the hard distribution ensemble D be part of the target function. u t From Theorem 7 and Lemma 8, we can now easily obtain a bit generator from a learning problem that is hard with respect to some input distribution ensemble.
Corollary9. Let F be a class of boolean functions, (R; E) a representation scheme for F, P a distribution ensemble over R, and D a distribution ensemble over f0;1g . Let (R; E) be evaluated by the circuit sequence E, let P be uniformly generated by the circuit sequence P, and let D be uniformly generated by the circuit sequence D. Then if F is not weakly predictable on average with respect to P and D, there is a CSPRBG computed by the uniform circuit sequence (E D) m(n) P for some xed polynomial m(n).
Improved Expansion via Nisan-Wigderson
The pseudorandom generator just described takes p(n) + m n truly random input bits to m n +m output bits, giving expansion e(n) = m ?p(n). While we can let e(n) attain any desired value by choosing m = m(n) as large as necessary, the expansion ratio (the number of output bits divided by the number of input bits) will not exceed 1 + 1=n. There are standard methods which can be used to amplify the expansion of any generator. However, these methods iterate the generator and therefore signi cantly increase the resulting circuit depth.
By applying a result due to Nisan and Wigderson 12] we can improve our generator to obtain a much greater expansion ratio without a correspondingly large increase in circuit depth (or size). However, in order to prove security, we will need to assume that the class of functions is hard to weakly predict on average even when the learning algorithm is provided with membership queries.
We now describe how this stronger intractability assumption allows us to modify our generator to obtain an expansion ratio on the order of n 2 rather than just O(1) as before.
The new CSPRBG G n takes as input a random string of p(n) + n 2 bits. As before, p(n) is the number of random input bits required by the circuit P n .
(For simplicity we assume that the hard distribution D n over the inputs f0;1g n is the uniform distribution; similar improvements can be given for the general case as was done above.) Call the additional n 2 input bits v = v 1 ;. .. ;v n 2 . It is described by Nisan and Wigderson 12] how to uniformly construct a family of n 4 sets S 1 ;.. .; S n 4 such that: (1) S i fv 1 ; .. .;v n 2 g; (2) jS i j = n for all i; and (3) jS i T S j j log n for all i 6 = j.
Our new generator will work as follows: as before, the rst p(n) bits are used to generate a function f 2 F n according to the distribution P n , and the remaining n 2 bits v are copied to the rst n 2 output bits. Now, however, if we let f i denote the function f applied to the subset of v 1 ; .. .;v n 2 indicated by the set S i , the (n 2 +i)th output bit is f i (v). Thus, G n takes p(n)+n 2 input bits and gives g(n) = n 2 + n 4 output bits, for an expansion ratio of (n 2 ). Note that the sets S i are xed as part of the generator description and thus are known to any potential adversary.
We now sketch the argument that if F is not weakly predictable on average even with membership queries, then G n is a CSPRBG. To see this, suppose the contrary that G n is not a CSPRBG. By standard arguments, there is an 1 i n 4 and a polynomial time algorithm T such that Pr f2Pn;v2f0;1g n 2 T(v;f 1 (v);. .. ;f i (v)) = f i+1 (v)] exceeds 1=2 + 1=q(n) for some polynomial q(n).
The function f i+1 only depends on the bits in S i+1 which without loss of generality we call v 1 ;. ..; v n . By an averaging argument we can nd a xed setting z = z n+1 ;. .. ;z n 2 2 f0;1g n 2 ?n of the remaining bits v n+1 ;. .. ;v n 2 such that Pr f2Pn;v2f0;1g n T(vz;f 1 (v;z);. ..; f i (v;z)) = f i+1 (v;z)] exceeds 1=2 + 1=q(n) for some polynomial q(n). Now we describe how a learner who can make membership queries can weakly predict F on average. By the Nisan-Wigderson construction, each f j other than f i+1 is actually a function of only logn bits in v 1 ;. .. ;v n (all other bits have been xed) and we know which log n bits since the sets S i are xed as part of the generator description. Thus the entire truth table of each f j is of size polynomial in n, and can be determined by making only n membership queries to f (the queries simply let the variables in S j T fv 1 ;. .. ;v n g assume all n possible settings while the remaining variables have their values xed according to z). To predict f(v) on a challenge input v the learner looks up the values of f j (vz) for 1 j i and then outputs T(vz; f 1 (vz);. .. ;f i (vz)). This weakly predicts f i+1 (vz) = f(v), and by contradiction proves our assertion that G n is a CSPRBG.
A One-Way Function Based on Hardness for Strong Prediction
We now show that under the weaker assumption that a class of functions is hard to strongly predict on average, we can construct a one-way function whose circuit depth is comparable to that of the function class plus that of the hard distributions. A related result is given by Impagliazzo and Levin 6].
De nition10. Let F = fF n g be a uniform sequence of circuits F n : f0;1g n ! f0;1g s(n) for some polynomial s(n). We say that F is a one-way function if there exists a polynomial q(n) such that for any polynomial time algorithm T, there exists an n 0 such that for all n n 0 , Pr x2f0;1g n F n (T(F n (x))) 6 = F n (x)] 1=q(n): Theorem11. Let F be a class of boolean functions, (R; E) a representation scheme for F (R n f0;1g r(n) ), P a distribution ensemble over R, and D a distribution ensemble over f0;1g . Let (R; E) be evaluated by the circuit sequence E, P be generated by the circuit sequence P, and D be generated by the circuit sequence D. Then if F is not strongly predictable on average with respect to P and D, there is a one-way function F computed by the uniform circuit sequence E m(n) (P;D m(n) ) for some xed polynomial m(n).
Proof. (Sketch) The construction is similar to that of the bit generator; the main di erences are the polynomial m(n) and the analysis. The input to the one-way function F n will consist of p(n)+m d(n) bits, where p(n) is the number of inputs to P n and d(n) is the number of inputs to D n . The rst p(n) bits are fed to P n to produce a representation f 2 R n of a function f 2 F n . The remaining m d(n) input bits are regarded as m blocks w 1 ; .. .; w m 2 f0;1g d(n) . Each w i is fed to a parallel copy of D n in order to produce an x i 2 f0;1g n ; if the w i are selected randomly, then the x i are distributed according to D n . Finally, each x i is given along with f to a parallel copy of E n in order to obtain E n ( f ; x i ) = f(x i ). The output of F n is then x 1 ; ... ;x m followed by f(x 1 );. .. ;f(x m ). Let q(n) be such that F is not 3=q(n)-predictable (with respect to P and D). For any xed f 2 F n , the probability over m random examples from D n that there exists a function f 0 2 F n agreeing with f on those examples, but that has error greater than 1=q(n) with respect to f and D, is at most jF n j(1?1=q(n)) m . This probability is smaller than 1=q(n) for m = (q(n) logjF n j + logq(n)]), (which is polynomial in n since logjF n j r(n)). We set m such that this is the case.
Thus, suppose that F is not a one-way function. Then there exists an algorithm T with probability at least 1?1=q(n) of nding an inverse for F n (v; w 1 then by the argument above there is probability at least 1 ? 1=q(n) that P n (v 0 )
represents a function f 0 with error at most 1=q(n), and we can simply compute f 0 (x). The probability that f 0 (x) = f(x) is at least 1 ? 3=q(n), violating the assumption that F is not 3=q(n)-predictable. u t
A Private-Key Cryptosystem Based on Hardness for Weak Prediction
In section we describe a simple and natural mapping from hard learning problems to private-key cryptosystems. This mapping has the property that if a simple function representation (for instance, DNF formulas) is hard to learn over a simple distribution (for instance, uniform) then encrypting and decrypting are both easy. De ne the function E n; (x) = E n ( ; x). For example, if (R; E) is a representation for DNF formulas, then E n is a circuit that takes a string representing a DNF formula f and some x, and produces f(x) as output. E n; , however, is just a depth-2 circuit.
A private-key cryptosystem is a tuple (G;E; D) of three probabilistic polynomial time algorithms. 4 The key generator G takes as input 1 n , and outputs a key k of length n. The encryption algorithm E takes as input a message m and a key k, and produces ciphertext as output. The decryption algorithm D takes as input ciphertext and a key and produces a message. We require that D(E(m; k); k) = m.
The private-key cryptosystems we will discuss are probabilistic schemes that encrypt one bit at a time, encrypting each bit independently from the previous ones, as in 5] . We use standard notions of chosen plaintext and/or ciphertext attack. Since we encrypt bits independently, we may say a system is secure if for any polynomial time algorithm T, polynomial q(n), and su ciently large n, the probability that after performing its allowed type of attack T correctly guesses the decryption of an encrypted random bit is less than 1=2 + 1=q(n).
Suppose F is a class of boolean functions, (R; E) a representation scheme for F, P a distribution ensemble over R, and D a distribution ensemble over f0;1g . In addition, suppose (R; E) is evaluated by the uniform circuit sequence E, and P and D are generated by the uniform circuit sequences P and D respectively. Assume that the probability a random example from D n is positive for a random function f from P n is in the range The cryptosystem based on F, P, and D is as follows. The key generator G uses input 1 n to generate P n . G then feeds p(n) random bits into P n to produce a string 2 R n . String is the key given to the encryption and decryption algorithms (so, technically, the security parameter is r(n)). Let f be the function represented by .
The encryption algorithm E begins by generating circuits D n and E n , and evaluating E n on the private key to create E n; . It encrypts a 1 by sending a random (according to D) positive example of f and encrypts a 0 by sending a random (according to D) negative example of f. This requires running D n on d(n) random bits to create an example x, and then computing E n; (x) to see if the example is of the appropriate type, repeating the procedure if it is not. Notice that the expected number of calls to D n and E n; is just 2 + o(1) by our assumption on D. (This could be improved by encrypting many bits at a time).
Decryption is even simpler than encryption. The decryption algorithm D begins by generating E n; , and then decrypts strings x by computing E n; (x).
Theorem12. If negative examples) and uses them to simulate E for M's plaintext queries. It then feeds the test inputx to M and uses M's response as the prediction. Since r(n) is polynomial in n, and M responds correctly with probability at least 1=2+ 1=poly(r(n)), this will be a weak prediction algorithm (for F with respect to P and D).
If M makes chosen ciphertext queries, the learning algorithm, if it is allowed membership queries, can answer these in the obvious way as membership and ciphertext queries are equivalent here. Thus, if (G;E; D) is vulnerable to chosen plaintext and ciphertext attack, then F is weakly predictable with membership queries with respect to P and D. u t
A Bit Generator Based on Parity Functions with Noise
Let S n denote the set of all parity functions over f0;1g n ; speci cally, for each of the 2 n subsets S = fx i1 ;. .. ;x ik g fx 1 ;. .. ;x n g there is a function f S 2 S n de ned by f S (x 1 ; ... ;x n ) = x i1 x ik :
In this section we describe a simple bit generator whose security is based on the assumption that parity functions are hard to learn in the presence of classi cation noise. This means that we add a parameter 0 < < 1=2 to our learning model called the noise rate, and now a learning algorithm, rather than always receiving a labeled example hx;f(x)i of the target function f, will instead receive a noisy labeled example hx;`i. Here`= f(x) with probability 1 ? and = :f(x) with probability where this choice is made independently for each requested example. Our speci c hardness assumption is as follows.
The Parity Assumption: For some xed constant 0 < < 1=2, there is no algorithm taking and n as input that runs in time polynomial in 1= and n, and for in nitely many n does the following: Given access to noisy examples from the uniform distribution U n on f0;1g n classi ed by an arbitrary f S 2 S n with noise rate , it produces the set S with probability at least 1 ? .
Note that in comparison with our de nitions in earlier sections, we have decreased the strength of our assumption in a number of ways. First, on those values of n for which a learning algorithm \succeeds", it must succeed for every function in S n . We have thus eliminated the distribution P n . Second, the learning algorithm must now actually nd the target concept with arbitrarily high con dence. Third, the learning algorithm must learn with a possibly large rate of noise in the labels.
The parity assumption is closely related to the problem of e ciently decoding random linear codes, which is a long-standing open problem. It is known that the problem of nding the parity function that minimizes the number of disagreements with an input set of labeled examples is NP-hard 2] (and easy to show it is MAX-SNP hard), and this optimization problem was used by McEliece 11] as the core of a proposed public-key cryptosystem with informal security arguments in which the matrix of examples must be carefully chosen. Recent results 8] provide some evidence in favor of the parity assumption by proving that parity functions cannot be learned using a certain class of statistical algorithms that include all known noise-tolerant learning algorithms in the Valiant model.
Based on the (unproven) parity assumption, we propose a simple pseudorandom bit generator. This generator is quite similar to a proposed one-way function due to Goldreich, Krawczyk and Luby 3], who then obtain a generator by running the one-way function through a generic transformation. Essentially, our contribution is to prove that the output of this one-way function is already pseudorandom. This stronger assertion is apparently already known to some researchers in the cryptography community as a \folk theorem".
The input seed to the generator G consists of s(n) = n + m n + H( ) m random bits, regarded as a block s f of n bits, followed by m blocks x 1 ;. .. ;x m of n bits each, followed by a block s r of H( ) m bits. Here m will be determined by the analysis, and H( ) is the binary entropy of the noise rate in the parity assumption.
The block s f encodes a parity function f S 2 S n ; each 1 in s f indicates a variable included in the subset S. As in our previous generator, x 1 .. .; x m , followed by`1; .. .;`m. Note that the output of G is a noisy sample of f S , but where the number of noisy labels is exactly b mc, rather than determined by m ips of a coin of bias as in the parity assumption; this discrepancy will be dealt with in the proof of the coming theorem.
G takes s(n) = n + m n + H( ) m random bits as input, and outputs t(n) = m n + m bits, for expansion t(n) ? s(n) = m(1 ? H( )) ? n. Thus we get expansion provided we choose m > (1=(1 ? H( )) n, which can be done so long as < 1=2.
Theorem13. Under the parity assumption, G is a pseudorandom bit generator.
Proof. (Sketch) The overall strategy is to show that the parity assumption in fact implies the stronger assumption (the strong parity assumption) that parity functions are not even weakly predictable on average (in the presence of noise rate ) with respect to the uniform distribution P n over S n and the uniform distribution U n over f0;1g n . The security of G can then be shown from arguments similar to that for the general bit generator outlined earlier. We must additionally show that the di culty of learning with noise rate implies the di culty of learning when the m examples requested by the learning algorithm contain exactly b mc errors.
To see that the parity assumption implies the strong parity assumption, consider an algorithm A that contradicts the latter. To break the parity assumption, we rst randomize S by XORing the labels given to examples with the classication given by some random parity function S 0 . Given such examples, A will perform noticeably better than guessing on a test examplex. However, instead of giving to A these examples, we give to A examples in which we have replaced the ith bit x i by a random bit in each. If x i was irrelevant to the classi cation (not in S S 0 ) the resulting distribution is indistinguishable from the original one, and A will still do better than random guessing. However, if x i 2 S S 0 , then there is now no correlation between the examples and the labels (the noise does not a ect this) and so A cannot do better than random guessing. Thus, by repeating this process we can determine which variables are relevant to the classi cation and recover S, breaking the parity assumption.
Finally, we must address the fact that our generator is always injecting a xed fraction of label errors rather than using a coin of bias . Suppose that the learning problem became easy provided that the noise model always injected exactly b mc errors into any sample of size m requested by the learning algorithm.
We could then run this \ xed-fraction" algorithm many times on its requested sample size m, where the m examples come from a source with probability of noise independently on each example. The probability that exactly m labels are noisy is certainly (1=m) regardless of the value of . So one of the runs of the xed-fraction algorithm must succeed with high probability, and we can determine which run by hypothesis testing. u t
